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of individuals.  We use data from the 1995-97 wave of the World Values Survey (WVS) to test 
the hypothesis that the relationship between happiness and ethics is bicausal in the sense that 
personal ethics affects one’s happiness while happiness also affects ethical preferences and 
proclivities.  We find that happiness increases in ethical proclivities and that greater happiness 
results in improved ethical judgments, after correcting for bicausality and controlling for income 
and other factors. 
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Are Happy People Ethical People? Evidence from North America and Europe 
 
Introduction 
 Over 2000 years ago, Plato (2000) argued that people should be just and ethical because 
that is the only source of true and lasting happiness.  That is, ethical people are happy people.  
The objective of this paper is to determine whether the reverse is also true: Are happy people 
more likely to be just and ethical than unhappy people?   
Data from the 1995-97 wave of the World Values Survey (WVS) are used to test the 
hypothesis that the relationship between happiness and ethics is bicausal in the sense that 
personal ethics affects one’s happiness or sense of satisfaction while satisfaction also affects 
ethical preferences and proclivities.  The WVS contains data on individual self-reports of 
subjective well-being, perceptions of ethical conduct, income, and other measures of individual 
respondent characteristics and is therefore ideal for examining empirically the relationship 
between happiness and ethical values.  In this study we focus on the self-reported well-being and 
ethical preferences of survey respondents from North America and Europe.  We find that the data 
are consistent with the hypothesis that happiness impacts ethical proclivities in a simultaneous or 
bicausal framework.  
 This paper contributes to a growing economic literature on happiness research (see Frey 
and Stutzer, 2002) by examining the impact of happiness on values and behavior.  This paper 
also contributes to the literature linking economics to moral theory and ethical behavior (see 
Hausman and McPherson, 1993) by answering the following question: If “the morality of 
economic agents influences their behavior and hence influences economic outcomes,” as 
Hausman and McPherson (p. 673) claim, does the causality also go the other way in that the 
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effect of economic outcomes, perhaps as manifested by their effects on individual happiness, 
feedback onto the morality of economic agents?  This paper provides evidence in the affirmative.  
This suggests that the ethical conduct of individuals could be influenced in part through policies 
that improve the (perceived) personal well-being or satisfaction of members of society.  
 
Background 
Happiness Research 
 The terms subjective well being (SWB), happiness, and life satisfaction are used 
interchangeably in the literature (see Diener, 1984; Diener, Suh, Lucas, and Smith, 1999; 
Veenhoven, 1993; Easterlin, 1995; Myers, 2000; McBride, 2001; Ryan and Deci, 2001).  As 
conventional wisdom suggests, questions such as “how happy are you? or “what is the level of 
life satisfaction you have? cannot be answered objectively, because every person quantifies in a 
personal way factors of life which, according to his own judgment, contribute to happiness.  
There is, however, a growing economic literature on the subject (see Frey and Stutzer, 2002).  
Although complementary, the economic approach differs somewhat from the psychological 
literature on SWB in that economists generally focus on material factors affecting happiness, 
while psychologists stress the role of personality as well as both material and immaterial factors 
(Easterlin, 2003).  Nevertheless, in both the economic and psychological literatures, a number of 
factors hypothesized to affect happiness have been studied, such as income, distribution of 
income, relative income, health, age, gender, race, nationality, education, employment status, 
marital status, socioeconomic status, inflation, religion, generosity, altruism, trust, political 
institutions, personality and behavior, self-fulfillment, environment, and family characteristics, 
among others.  In spite of the extensive research, it is difficult to assess direct effects because 
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many of these factors are interrelated and the exact flow of causation is in question.  As McBride 
(2001, p. 255) says: “On the surface it appears a mess, and below the surface it appears even less 
clear.” 
 One of the most examined factors expected to affect happiness is income.  Does money 
buy happiness?  According to the literature, the answer is both yes and no: Yes, for income 
levels low enough that they cannot satisfy basic needs, but no for higher income levels 
(Veenhoven, 1984; Kenny, 1999; Diener, 2000; Myers, 2000; Konow and Early, 2002).  Put 
differently, income can only explain a small part of total happiness (Frey and Stutzer, 2002).  
The reason is that two things seem to be important in understanding the relationship between 
income and happiness – relative wealth and aspirations.  First, people do not necessarily take into 
consideration their absolute wealth but rather their wealth relative to others (Easterlin, 1995).  
For example, if income increases but at a lower rate than others, then research finds that overall 
happiness tends to decrease.  Second, if aspirations increase at a higher rate than income, then 
that could also erode SWB (Easterlin, 2001; Stutzer, 2004).  According to Easterlin (1995), this 
is the reason why the rise in income that occurred during the last few decades in the US, Japan, 
and Western Europe did not result in an increased level of happiness.  It is the gap between one’s 
aspirations and achievements that determines happiness (Frey and Stutzer, 2002).  Wilson (1967) 
was one of the first scholars who used the term aspirations in his examination of the correlation 
between income and education.  He argued that people with high income and low education are 
often happier than people with high income and high education because those with low education 
exceeded their initially low educational aspirations.  He also stated that modest aspirations are a 
key for happiness.  Excessively ambitious people who never manage to close the gap between 
their aspirations and deeds are generally dissatisfied.  For example, Hesiod, writing 400 years 
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before Aristotle, told his corrupted brother Perses who bribed judges in order to seize Hesiod’s 
property, that even if he gets all his property he will still be poor because his needs are 
excessively high and he wants everything.  
 
Linking Happiness and Ethics 
 Greek mythology teaches that the way of virtue is full of difficulty and hardship, whereas 
the way of vice is pleasant and worry free.  For instance, when Hercules had to make the 
decision on which of the two paths he would follow in his life, Virtue and Vice appeared as two 
women and each described her path.  Hercules chose to follow the path of virtue no matter the 
number of hardships, leaving aside the tempting path of vice.  Philosophers, such as Plato and 
Aristotle, and religious leaders, including Christ and Buddha, taught that the way to lasting 
happiness is by being ethical and virtuous.  
 To our knowledge there have been no studies examining the direct effect of ethics on 
happiness.  However, recent scholarship has examined the how aspects of ethical attitudes and 
behavior, such as altruism, relate to happiness.  For instance, Margolis (1982) developed a theory 
of individual behavior based in part on altruism.  He argued that people have two objective 
functions – one which satisfies self oriented preferences and one which is group oriented – and 
that there is a trade-off between the two functions.  Similarly, Konow and Early (2002) described 
the “hedonistic paradox” as one in which people obtain greater happiness by helping others 
rather than by being self-oriented.  The paradox has its roots in two basic theories that explain 
happiness – the hedonistic and eudaimonistic approaches (Ryan and Deci, 2001).  According to 
the hedonistic approach, happiness is the result of avoiding pain and seeking pleasure.  It is a 
self-oriented approach that places emphasis on the acquisition of material goods.  In contrast, the 
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eudaimonistic approach is based on the idea that happiness arises as people function and interact 
within society.  This approach places emphasis on non-material pursuits.  Aristotle was a 
proponent of the eudaimonistic view.  He claimed that man is a “social animal” who needs to be 
socialized and who must develop strong social bonds with other members of society, part of 
which come by helping others.  He considered the supporters of the hedonistic approach to be 
slaves of their own desires (see Ryan and Deci, 2001).  In related work, Myers (2000) argued 
that the need to belong is embedded in our nature as social beings.  We care not only for those 
we love, such as close family members or close friends, but also for other members of society 
with whom we must live and interact.   
Therefore, people who value non-material goods relatively more than material goods may 
prefer to sacrifice income generating activities in order to devote more time to social activities 
such as voluntarism, going to church, and so forth, that generate satisfaction to them.  Thus, 
Phelps (2001) found that married altruists are happier than married non-altruists, even after 
controlling for income and family size.  The definition of an altruist in Phelps’ framework is the 
one who “derives satisfaction from the well-being of the members of the family” (p.294).  
Similarly, voluntarism is found to be positively correlated with happiness in that people who 
volunteer appear to be more satisfied with their life than those who do not volunteer (Thoits and 
Hewiit, 2001; Meier and Stutzer, 2004).  And, empirical evidence suggests that people who are 
intrinsically motivated, or who “define their values by themselves,” manifest greater happiness 
levels than those motivated only by extrinsic incentives (Frey and Stutzer, 2002, p.410).1  
Interestingly, Hesiod offered an expressive description of Give which contrasts with Seize: “Give 
is a good girl, but Seize is bad and she brings death.  For the man who gives willingly, even 
                                                 
1 This might explain why Lipford and Tollison (2003) found a negative correlation between religion and income.   
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though he gives a great thing, rejoices in his gift and is glad in heart; but whoever gives way to 
shamelessness and seizes something himself, even though it be a small thing, it freezes his heart” 
(Hesiod, v. 356-360).   
 Although these studies examine only components of ethics, the research suggests that 
ethics per se ought to affect happiness.  In addition to the question of whether ethics affects 
happiness, we are also interested in examining whether the causality also runs from happiness to 
ethics.  There is research suggesting that the relationship between ethics and happiness might be 
bicausal.  For example, Myers (1993) argued that the happier someone is, the more willing he is 
to contribute to another’s well-being.  Inglehart (1999) found that higher levels of life 
satisfaction increase trust among the members of society.  Konow and Early (2002) found that 
happier persons behave much more generously than unhappy persons.  And both Thoits and 
Hewitt (2001) and Meier and Stutzer (2004) found not only that volunteering increases 
happiness, but also that higher reported well-being increases the incidence of volunteerism.   
Veenhoven (1984) argued that the evidence on the issue of causality is not conclusive and 
that further research is needed.  This paper contributes to this direction.  We wish to examine 
whether ethics affects happiness and happiness affects ethics.  As Epicurus put it, “we cannot 
live pleasantly without living wisely, honorably, and justly; nor live wisely, honorably, and justly 
without living pleasantly.  For the virtues have grown into one with a pleasant life, and a pleasant 
life is inseparable from them.” 
 
A Recursive (Bicausal) Relationship between Happiness and Ethics 
 In order to establish specific hypotheses regarding the relationship between ethics and 
happiness, we propose that a representative agent’s time t utility or happiness is u , );,( kmet
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which is assumed to be a twice continuously differentiable function of personal ethical 
proclivities (e), money income (m), and other factors (k).  Importantly, we assume that the 
agent’s personal ethics can be represented along a continuum (e.g., ranging from "low" to 
"high").  For example, consider the case of lying.  There are different types of lies and different 
motivations for lying that range from altruistic to individualistic to exploitive (Linskold and 
Water, 1983).  Suppose e represents the degree of honesty chosen by the agent in a particular 
context, where being honesty is understood to be the inverse of lying.  A high e might represent 
the telling of no lies, while a lower e indicates the telling of altruistic lies.  As e declines further 
the individual might be found telling individualistic lies, with very low values of e representing 
the telling of exploitive lies. 
We are interested in determining whether ethical judgments are also a function of utility.  
This can be illustrated within a recursive framework so that time t ethical judgments are a 
function of time t  utility.1− 2  In this case utility would be represented as u . );),(( 1 kmue tt −
First, will an increase in one’s ethical proclivities increase or decrease one’s happiness 
(i.e., what is the sign of )?  The discussion above suggests that utility increases when 
people behave ethically, such as when they are altruistic or volunteer regularly.  However, these 
studies did not examine the direct effect of ethics on happiness, only components of ethics.  We 
are interested in whether, and how, ethics impacts happiness empirically.  Thus, we propose the 
null hypothesis that ethics has no effect on happiness, other things being equal.  Our alternative 
hypothesis is that happiness increases in ethics. 
eut ∂∂ /
                                                 
2 For an example of a recursive model in which past happiness affects current behavior, see Hermalin and Isen 
(1999). 
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 Second, does an increase in money increase or decrease utility (i.e., what is the sign of 
)?  According to economic theory, an increase in income will result in an increase in 
happiness.  However, as discussed above, the empirical evidence is weak.  Although an 
examination of the relationship between income and happiness is not the principal objective of 
this paper, we control for the effect of income on happiness.  Therefore, we propose the null 
hypothesis that income has no effect on happiness, other things being equal, with the alternative 
hypothesis that income increases happiness.
mut ∂∂ /
3 
Third, is the relationship between utility and ethics bicausal (e.g., recursive), in the sense 
that ethical judgments affect happiness and happiness affects ethics (i.e., what is the sign of 
)?  We are interested in exploring empirically the issue of whether, and how, happiness 
affects ethics.  Following Meier and Stutzer (2004), happiness can affect ethical proclivities in 
one of two ways:  Happiness could lower the marginal costs of behaving ethically, or it could 
increase the marginal benefit of behaving ethically.  Although we present no formal theoretical 
model of how happiness affects ethics, the discussion above suggests that we should find not 
only that ethics affects happiness but also that happiness affects ethics.  Thus, we propose the 
null hypothesis that happiness has no effect on ethics, other things being equal.  Our alternative 
hypothesis is that happiness increases one’s ethical proclivities, as expected, other things being 
equal. 
1/ −∂∂ tue
                                                 
3 There is a growing literature suggesting that the relationship between income and happiness is bicausal (see 
Diener, 1999) in that causality could run from happiness to income (Kenny, 1999).  Nevertheless, because our 
interest is in the causal relationship between ethics and happiness, we will not directly address the income-happiness 
causality problem but control only for the effect of income on happiness. 
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Fourth, if the utility function is well-behaved,4 then isoutility or indifference curves in 
ethics and money space (i.e., with ethics on one axis and money income on the other) will be 
convex to the origin.  This implies that an increase in income will be associated with a decrease 
in ethical judgments when utility or happiness is held constant.  Therefore, we are interested in 
determining how ethics is affected by income when holding utility or happiness constant.  We 
propose the null hypothesis that income has no effect on ethics, holding happiness and other 
factors constant, with the alternative hypothesis that income and ethics are inversely correlated.  
 
Data and Empirical Methods 
 We examine the empirical relationship between personal ethics and happiness using data 
from the third (1995-97) wave of the World Values Survey (WVS).5  The WVS is a compilation 
of over 60 surveys conducted in more than 50 countries around the world.  The surveys involved 
face-to-face interviews with adult citizens ages 18 and older, and they were conducted in the 
respondent’s native language.  According to the research team responsible for designing and 
administering the world-wide surveys, interview subjects were selected randomly “from all 
administrative regional units after stratification by region and degree of urbanization” (Inglehart 
et al, 2000, p. 7).  This analysis will focus only on a sample drawn from North America and 
Europe.  The reason for limiting the empirical analysis to these regions of the world is that North 
America and Europe possess a relatively common Judeo-Christian heritage and have reasonably 
                                                 
4 The utility function is well-behaved if 0/ >∂∂  and eut 0/ >∂∂ mut  imply that ∂  and 
 so that indifference curves are convex to the origin. 
0/ 22 <∂eut
0/ 22 <∂∂ mut
5 See Inglehart et al (2000) for a description of the WVS. 
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well-developed economic structures and systems of government.  This is necessary in order to 
control for variations in the development of social norms and ethical standards across different 
societies.  The sample consists of approximately 11,000 total observations with the following 
characteristics: roughly 49 percent of respondents were male, 47 percent were employed, 11 
percent had completed a college education, 56 percent were married, and the average respondent 
was between 35 and 44 years of age.  During the interviews, respondents were asked questions 
regarding their personal finances, familial and social relationships, and opinions on politics, the 
economy, and various religious, social and moral topics.  Respondents were also asked to give 
their opinions on a variety of ethical scenarios and to evaluate their subjective well-being or 
happiness.  According to Frey and Stutzer (2002, p. 403), “reported subjective well-being is a 
satisfactory empirical approximation of individual utility.”  Therefore, the data provided by the 
WVS can provide an adequate basis for determining whether happiness affects ethical 
preferences as modeled above.  
 In order to examine the joint effects of happiness and ethics, we estimate the following 
system of equations:  
εαααα ++++= rsOtherFactoIncomeEthicsHappiness k210  
εββββ ++++= rsOtherFactoIncomeHappinessEthics k210  
 
 In this model, Ethics is constructed from answers provided by respondents to statements 
describing five hypothetical ethical scenarios.  Specifically, respondents were asked, “Please tell 
me for each of the following statements whether you think it can always be justified, never be 
justified, or something in between.”  The following statements were then presented to the 
respondents: 
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• “Claiming government benefits to which you are not entitled.” 
• “Avoiding a fare on public transport.” 
• “Cheating on taxes if you have a chance.” 
• “Buying something you knew was stolen.” 
• “Someone accepting a bribe in the course of their duties.” 
Respondents were asked how they would rank each statement, using a scale ranging from 
one to ten, where one indicated “never justifiable” and ten indicated “always justifiable.”  The 
scores from each of the five questions were summed together and then subtracted from 55 so as 
to create the variable Ethics, which ranged from a low of five to a high of 50.  We assume that 
the higher the value of Ethics, the greater are the ethical proclivities of the respondent.6 
Two measures of subjective happiness are provided in the WVS data and are used as 
proxies for Happiness.  The first (which we refer to as “how happy”) is derived from the 
following question: “Taking all things together, would you say you are …” very happy, quite 
happy, not very happy, or not at all happy?  The second (which we refer to as “how satisfied”) is 
based on the question: “All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole 
these days?”  For this question the respondent was asked to indicate on a scale of one to ten, with 
                                                 
6 This measure of ethics, in which a low score indicates a low ethical proclivity and a high score represents a high 
ethical proclivity, and which is obtained from summing scores from multiple evaluative ethical criteria, is not unlike 
the “semantic differential” introduced by Osgood, Suci, and Tannenbaum (1957), who argued that an objective 
measurement of an attitude could be obtained by summing the scores from multiple polarized continua.  For 
instance, a listener’s attitude toward a speaker could be obtained by asking him to rate on a seven point scale how 
the speaker faired among a variety of criteria, such as harmful-beneficial, negative-positive, and unfair-fair, and by 
adding those rankings together. 
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one representing “dissatisfied” and ten representing “satisfied,” how satisfied he felt.  Both 
measures of happiness were used in the analysis in order to test for consistency of responses and 
robustness of the empirical findings.  Summary statistics for these and other variables used in the 
study are provided in Table 1. 
We control for income as well as other factors expected to impact the relationship 
between happiness and ethics.  Income is proxied by the self-reports of respondents indicating 
where their household income falls within a ten-point scale of national average household 
income (i.e., which decile household income falls in), such that a one indicates the first or lowest 
decile and a ten represents the tenth or highest decile.  Other control factors include: whether 
respondents feel they have free choice and control over their lives, the respondent’s current 
marital status, the gender of the respondent, the respondent’s age, the respondent’s assessment of 
their health, the amount of education obtained by the respondent, the respondent’s religious 
beliefs, and his nationality. 
Research indicates that freedom and happiness are positively correlated (Frey and Stutzer, 
2002) because people value the ability to exercise control in their lives.  Additionally, the 
question of how happiness and ethics are related presumes that people are capable of making 
decisions, ethical otherwise.  Therefore, we control for the extent to which respondents believe 
they have freedom of choice in their lives in both the Happiness and Ethics equations.  This 
variable ranges from a low of one to a high of ten and represents the respondent’s assessment of 
the degree of freedom of choice and control he has over the way his life turns out.   
Marriage has been found to affect happiness in a significant and positive way (Wilson, 
1967; Diener, 1984; Diener, Suh, Lucas, and Smith, 1999; Easterlin 2003).  Moreover, we expect 
that people who are married will have a different outlook on life than those who are not, thus 
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affecting the degree to which they might be willing to engage in unethical conduct.  Therefore, 
we control for the marital status of respondents in both equations with a dummy variable that 
takes on the value of one if the respondent was married at the time of the survey interview, zero 
otherwise.  
 We also control for respondent gender and age in the Ethics and Happiness equations.  
Research indicates that older rather than younger, and female rather than male, individuals have 
higher ethical sensitivities (Collins, 2000).  Therefore, we expect gender and age to be 
significantly correlated with ethics.  Whether gender and age are related to happiness is more 
controversial, however.  While some psychologists argue that women are more inclined to 
depression than men, they also exhibit higher levels of positive affect; so on average there might 
not be a significant difference in the level of happiness between men and women (Diener, Suh, 
Lucas, and Smith, 1999).  With respect to age, Diener, Suh, Lucas, and Smith (1999, p. 291) 
argued that “life satisfaction does not decline with age.”  We control for gender with a dummy 
variable that takes on the value of one if the respondent was male and zero if the respondent was 
female.  We control for the age by a variable that identifies the age of the respondent within one 
of six specified age group categories (see Table 1 for specific classification).  
 In order to ensure the model is identified, we include variables for health and education in 
the Happiness equation only and respondent religious beliefs and nationality in the Ethics 
equation only.  Wilson argued that a happy person is a healthy person (Wilson, 1967) and van 
Praag, Frijters, and Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2003) found that health is strongly correlated with 
happiness.  However, Diener and Lucas (2000) explained that much empirical research has 
shown weak or even no correlation between health and happiness because subjective assessments 
of health are often correlated with happiness, but objective measures of health are not.  We 
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control for the health of respondents in the Happiness equation with a variable that ranges from 
one to five and represents the respondent’s self-assessment of his health, with one being low and 
five being high.  The effect of education on happiness has been examined empirically, although 
some researchers find only a weak effect (see Diener, 1984; Diener, Suh, Lucas, and Smith, 
1999; Veenhoven, 1984).  Nevertheless, we control for the educational level of respondents in 
the Happiness equation by including a dummy variable that equals one if the respondent 
obtained at least some university-level schooling.  
Individuals who believe in God and Hell might believe that ethical behavior would 
ultimately be rewarded while unethical behavior would be punished.  Indeed, research indicates 
that religious people have greater ethical sensitivities than non-religious people (Conroy and 
Emerson, 2004; see also Collins, 2000). Therefore, we control for the religious beliefs of 
respondents in the Ethics equation with a dummy variable which takes the value of one if the 
respondent believes both in God and Hell, zero otherwise.  Finally, research suggests that 
nationality plays an important role in the ethical tendencies and preference of individuals, with 
Americans showing greater ethical sensitivities than other nationalities (see Collins, 2000). 
Therefore, we control for the nationality of respondents in the Ethics equation by including a 
dummy variable that takes on the value of one if the respondent is from the United States and 
Canada and zero if the respondent is from a European nation. 
Because the how happy, how satisfied, Income decile, and variables representing 
perceptions of freedom of choice and respondent health are ordinal rather than cardinal, we 
employ the transformation procedure outlined by Terza (1987) to replace each discrete category 
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value (e.g., 1 through J) with a number when estimating the joint system of equations.7  If  
(where ) is the discrete category value for variable D, then  is replaced with 
, where n is the probability density function of the standard normal 
distribution evaluated at 
jd
Jj ,...,1=
jj )( 11 δ −−−
jd
jjjj pnnd /)]([ˆ δ=
jδ ,  is the percentage of the sample observed in category j, and jp jδ  is 
calculated as follows: First, let  
 11 )( pdN =  
 212 )( ppdN +=  
 … 
 1211 ...)( −− +++= jj pppdN . 
Then,  
 , ()(
1
1 ∑
=
−=
j
i
ij pNδ 1,...,1 −= Jj ), 
where  is the inverse of the standard normal cumulative distribution function, and 1−N −∞=0δ  
and +∞=Jδ .8  
 
Results 
We report the results of our empirical examination of the Happiness and Ethics equations 
in Tables 2 and 3, using single-equation as well as two-stage and three-stage least squares 
                                                 
7 See van Praag, B.M.S., P. Frijters, and A. Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2003) for a related discussion. 
8 Summary statistics on the transformed variables are as follows:  for How happy, mean=0.267, S.D.=0.773; for 
How satisfied, mean=0.362, S.D.=0.766; for Income decile, mean=0.154, S.D.=0.907; for the freedom of choice 
variable, mean=0.211, S.D.=0.807; and for the health variable, mean=0.303, S.D.=0.909. 
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simultaneous equation estimation procedures.  Table 2 shows results for respondent self-reports 
of “how happy” they are as a proxy for happiness, and Table 3 shows results for self-reports of 
“how satisfied” as the proxy.  Both tables show that ethics is a significant factor affecting 
happiness and that happiness is a significant factor affecting ethics.  Indeed, the simultaneous 
equation estimation provides strong evidence that happiness and ethics are related in a bicausal 
relationship, in that ethics increases happiness and happiness improves ethical proclivities.  We 
note that while ethics and happiness appear to be bicausally related, our analysis shows that the 
explanatory power of the Happiness and Ethics models is not particularly strong.  In the three 
stage least squares analysis, approximately 17 percent of the variation in the “how happy” 
variable and respondent ethics is explained jointly by the proposed factors, while 21 percent of 
the variation in the “how satisfied” variable and ethics analysis is explained by the included 
variables.  Although this is consistent with other studies examining correlates of happiness (see 
Diener and Lucas, 2000), it suggests that in reality the relationship between subjective well-
being and ethical tendencies is more complex than how it is modeled here.   
 We first consider the evidence presented in Table 2.  The table shows that the impact of 
ethics on happiness and happiness on ethics is improved under the simultaneous equation 
estimation procedures.  This supports our contention that happiness and ethics are bicausally 
related.  For instance, in the single equation model, a one standard deviation increase in the 
ethics variable increases happiness (as measured by the “how happy” variable) by 0.025, while in 
the three stage least squares model, a one standard deviation increase in ethics increases 
happiness by 0.509, or nearly two-thirds of a standard deviation of happiness, other things being 
equal.  Because ethics is positively and significantly correlated with the happiness, we can reject 
the first null hypothesis that ethics has no impact on happiness.  
 
 Our analysis also provides evidence that happiness is increased as income increases, 
although the effect is small.  A one standard deviation increase in self-reported income decile 
results in an increase in happiness by 0.060, which is less than one-tenth of a standard deviation 
improvement in happiness.  Thus, we are able to reject the second null hypothesis.  However, we 
conjecture that the weak effect of income on happiness is a manifestation of the fact that relative 
income and aspirations are more important determinants of happiness than the absolute level of 
income, as discussed above.  
 The effect of happiness on ethics is positive and significant, thus leading us to reject the 
third null hypothesis.  Specifically, a one standard deviation increase in happiness increases the 
ethical proclivities measure by 3.414, which corresponds to approximately a one-half standard 
deviation improvement in ethical proclivities, other things being equal.  Moreover, the impact of 
happiness on ethics is the strongest effect of all of the variables in the Ethics equation (from the 
three stage least squares procedure), when compared to a one standard deviation increase in each 
variable.  Thus, subjective well-being appears to be a particularly important determinant of 
ethical proclivities. 
 Interestingly, income is negatively correlated with ethics, although the effect is small.  A 
one standard deviation increase in the income decile of respondents reduces the value of the 
ethics variable by 0.185, which translates into a mere three percentage point standard deviation 
reduction in ethical proclivities.  Even though the effect of income is small it is significant; thus, 
we can reject the fourth null hypothesis that says income and ethics are not related.  Moreover, 
the fact that an increase in income reduces ethics, in combination with evidence that income and 
ethics are positively correlated with happiness, suggest that indifference curves in ethics and 
income space are indeed convex.  This is important, as it supports the idea that ethics and money 
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can be modeled using standard economic models of utility.  It is also evidence that individuals 
seem to be willing to trade-off income and ethics, other things being equal. 
 These findings are supported by the evidence presented in Table 3, in which self-reports 
of “how satisfied” respondents are is used as a proxy for happiness.  In particular, we find that 
the simultaneous estimation procedures confirm that happiness and ethics are bicausally related.  
Examining the Happiness and Ethics equations from the three stage least squares estimation 
procedure, we find that happiness is increased in ethics, happiness is increased in income, ethics 
is increased in happiness, and income is negatively correlated with ethics, other things being 
equal, thus leading us to reject each of the four null hypotheses.  For example, a one standard 
deviation increase in the ethics variable increases happiness (as measured by the “how satisfied” 
variable) by 0.356, which is slightly less than one-half a standard deviation improvement in 
happiness.  Furthermore, a one standard deviation increase in happiness increases ethical 
proclivities by nearly three-fifths of a standard deviation.  As in Table 2, we find that the effect 
of happiness on ethics is the strongest of all the variables in the Ethics model, in comparison to a 
one standard deviation increase in each variable. 
 Examining the other variables included in our analysis, we find that increases in the 
respondent’s assessments of personal freedom and control in life significantly improves 
happiness as proxied by both the “how happy” and “how satisfied” measures, but it does not 
have a significant effect on ethical proclivities.  We also find that marriage is positively 
correlated with both happiness and ethics, while males are significantly less happy and have 
lower ethical proclivities than females, other things being equal.  Finally, age is positively 
correlated with happiness and ethics, although it is statistically not significant for the Happiness 
equation in which “how happy” is used as a proxy for happiness.  
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 Considering the variables unique to the Happiness equation, we find that individuals with 
higher self-assessed levels of health are, on average, happier than those who assess their health 
as relatively poor.  For example, a one standard deviation increased in perceived health increases 
happiness by slightly less than one-third a standard deviation.  Education, however, is negatively 
correlated with happiness, although it is significant only when the “how satisfied” measure is 
used as a proxy for happiness.  For the variables unique to the Ethics equation, we find that 
individuals who have a belief in God and Hell express higher ethical proclivities than those who 
do not believe in God and Hell.  We also find that respondents from North America have higher 
ethical proclivities that respondents from Europe, other things being equal.  
 
Conclusions 
 The idea that happiness and ethics are related is not a new one, because philosophers and 
religious leaders have argued for at least two millennia that happiness is improved when 
individuals behave ethically.  Nevertheless, this paper provides empirical evidence that ethics 
affects happiness.  Importantly, this paper shows that the reverse is also true: Happiness impacts 
ethics.  Hence, improved ethical proclivities increase one’s satisfaction with life, which in turn 
increases the propensity for positive ethical attitudes and conduct.  
 How important is happiness as a factor influencing ethical judgments?  The empirical 
evidence suggests that improvements in ethical judgments could be obtained by improving the 
perceived well-being of people, although other factors, such as individual characteristics and 
environmental factors, are also germane.  An important question that remains involves an 
understanding of the tradeoffs that exist among the various factors influencing ethical behavior. 
How happy must a person be in order to counter the negative influences of culture or 
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environmental surroundings on ethical behavior?  An additional question concerns how the 
impact of happiness on ethics varies across societies with dramatically different cultures and 
social norms.  Is the expected improvement in ethical behavior resulting from an increase in self-
reported happiness of U.S. citizens the same for citizens of, say, South Africa or Bangladesh?  
These and other questions probing the causes of unethical behavior must continue to be explored 
within the social sciences. 
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Table 1. Variable names, definitions, and summary statistics, with the corresponding World 
Values Survey question number identified in brackets. 
 
Variable Definition Mean S.D. 
Ethics Variable ranging from 5 to 50 comprised of the sum of rankings of 
“never justifiable”=1 to “always justifiable”=10 indicated by 
respondents to five ethical scenarios, subtracted from 55. [V192-
V196] 
 
45.558 6.365 
How happy 
(happiness 
proxy) 
Variable ranging from 1 to 4 based on the question: “Taking all 
things together, would you say you are …” very happy, quite 
happy, not very happy, or not at all happy?  Responses are coded 
as follows:  “not at all happy”=1, “not very happy”=2, “quite 
happy”=3, and “very happy”=4. [V10] 
 
3.209 0.623 
How satisfied 
(happiness 
proxy) 
Variable ranging from 1 to 10 based on the question: “All things 
considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these 
days?” with 1 being dissatisfied and 10 being satisfied. [V65] 
 
7.437 1.943 
Income decile Variable representing respondent’s self report of household 
income, selected from a scale of incomes divided into deciles, with 
lowest income=1 and highest income=10. [V227] 
 
5.007 2.593 
Perceived 
freedom of 
choice 
Variable ranging from 1 to 10 indicated respondent’s assessment 
of the degree of freedom of choice and control they have over the 
way their life turns out, where 1 indicates “none at all” and 10 
represents “a great deal.” [V66] 
 
7.194 2.017 
Married Dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent was currently 
married; zero otherwise. [V89] 
 
0.559 0.497 
Male Dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent was a male; zero 
otherwise. [V214] 
 
0.485 0.500 
Respondent age 
group 
Variable identifying the age group of the respondent, where ages 
18-24=1, 25-34=2, 35-44=3, 45-54=4, 55-64=5, and 65 and 
older=6. [AGEGROUP] 
 
3.418 1.643 
Assessed health Variable ranging from 1 to 5 representing respondent’s assessment 
of their health, with “very good”=5, “good”=4, “fair”=3, 
“poor”=2, and “very poor”=1. [V11] 
 
3.976 0.876 
Educated Dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent obtained at least 
some university-level schooling; zero otherwise. [V217] 
 
0.164 0.370 
Believe in God 
and Hell 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent indicated 
affirmatively that he believed in God and hell; zero otherwise. 
[V183 and V187] 
 
0.281 0.449 
North 
American 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent was from the USA or 
Canada; zero otherwise (i.e., if the respondent was from France, 
Britain, West Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, 
Sweden, Iceland, Finland, Belgium, Spain, Ireland, Northern 
Ireland, Switzerland, Portugal, Austria, or Andalusia). [V2] 
0.140 0.347 
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Table 2. Empirical results for happiness and ethics models in which “How happy” is a proxy for 
happiness. 
 
 
Single-equation OLS 
Coefficients 
(t-statistic) 
 
2SLS  
Coefficients 
(t-statistic) 
 
3SLS  
Coefficients 
(t-statistic) 
Variable Happiness Ethics  Happiness Ethics  Happiness Ethics 
         
Ethics 
 
 
0.004* 
(3.33) 
  0.049* 
(5.83) 
  0.080* 
(12.04) 
 
How happy 
 
 
 0.321* 
(3.50) 
  3.791* 
(6.28) 
  4.416* 
(9.27) 
Income decile 
 
 
0.069* 
(7.16) 
-0.240* 
(-2.95) 
 0.070* 
(6.71) 
-0.226* 
(-2.55) 
 0.066* 
(6.53) 
-0.330* 
(-3.80) 
Assessed freedom of 
choice 
 
0.179* 
(18.07) 
0.153 
(1.79) 
 0.176* 
(16.48) 
0.164 
(1.79) 
 0.170* 
(16.00) 
0.127 
(1.39) 
Married 
 
 
0.205* 
(11.87) 
1.506* 
(10.23) 
 0.201* 
(10.79) 
1.522* 
(9.52) 
 0.194* 
(10.46) 
1.536* 
(9.63) 
Male 
 
 
-0.033* 
(-2.12) 
-0.984* 
(-7.37) 
 -0.036* 
(-2.11) 
-1.013* 
(-6.93) 
 -0.035* 
(-2.08) 
-0.993* 
(-6.80) 
Respondent agegroup 
 
 
0.003 
(0.56) 
0.847* 
(19.57) 
 0.006 
(1.00) 
0.840* 
(17.78) 
 0.009 
(1.59) 
0.809* 
(17.19) 
Assessed health 
 
 
0.223* 
(24.02) 
  0.222* 
(22.20) 
  0.247* 
(34.60) 
 
Educated 
 
 
-0.024 
(-1.14) 
  -0.019 
(-0.85) 
  -0.017 
(-1.06) 
 
Believe in God and 
Hell 
 
 0.953* 
(6.14) 
  0.955* 
(5.62) 
  1.155* 
(9.54) 
North American 
 
 
 1.228* 
(6.08) 
  1.090* 
(4.90) 
  2.044* 
(12.75) 
Constant 
 
 
-0.142 
(-2.43) 
41.686* 
(231.64) 
 -2.198* 
(-5.72) 
40.755* 
(161.98) 
 -3.627* 
(-11.94) 
40.472* 
(175.21) 
Adj R2 
F-statistic 
(prob) 
0.160 
193.65 
(<.0001) 
0.105 
118.77 
(<.0001) 
 0.143 
169.32 
(<.0001) 
0.092 
102.76 
(<.0001) 
 0.169 
 
* significant at the 5% level or better in two-tailed tests 
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Table 3. Empirical results for happiness and ethics models in which “How satisfied” is a proxy 
for happiness. 
 
 
Single-equation OLS 
Coefficients 
(t-statistic) 
 
2SLS  
Coefficients 
(t-statistic) 
 
3SLS  
Coefficients 
(t-statistic) 
Variable Happiness Ethics  Happiness Ethics  Happiness Ethics 
         
Ethics 
 
 
0.004* 
(3.46) 
  0.029* 
(3.82) 
  0.056* 
(8.56) 
 
How satisfied 
 
 
 0.471* 
(4.83) 
  4.047* 
(5.69) 
  4.919* 
(8.03) 
Income decile 
 
 
0.080* 
(8.88) 
-0.274* 
(-3.36) 
 0.080* 
(8.65) 
-0.235* 
(-2.63) 
 0.075* 
(8.26) 
-0.204* 
(-2.31) 
Assessed freedom of 
choice 
 
0.355* 
(38.35) 
0.044 
(0.48) 
 0.354* 
(37.12) 
0.176 
(1.90) 
 0.349* 
(36.73) 
0.173 
(1.87) 
Married 
 
 
0.085* 
(5.24) 
1.556* 
(10.65) 
 0.085* 
(5.12) 
1.556* 
(9.67) 
 0.080* 
(4.84) 
1.537* 
(9.56) 
Male 
 
 
-0.047* 
(-3.18) 
-0.985* 
(-7.37) 
 -0.050* 
(-3.33) 
-1.029* 
(-6.99) 
 -0.050* 
(-3.33) 
-1.038* 
(-7.06) 
Respondent agegroup 
 
 
0.039* 
(7.71) 
0.832* 
(19.27) 
 0.042* 
(8.32) 
0.842* 
(17.70) 
 0.045* 
(8.96) 
0.852* 
(17.95) 
Assessed health 
 
 
0.204* 
(23.54) 
  0.204* 
(22.94) 
  0.224* 
(30.91) 
 
Educated 
 
 
-0.060* 
(-3.05) 
  -0.056* 
(-2.78) 
  -0.038* 
(-2.27) 
 
Believe in God and 
Hell 
 
 0.981* 
(6.32) 
  0.975* 
(5.69) 
  0.957* 
(6.87) 
North American 
 
 
 1.293* 
(6.42) 
  1.090* 
(4.86) 
  0.724* 
(3.94) 
Constant 
 
 
-0.118* 
(-2.16) 
41.624* 
(230.95) 
 -1.258* 
(-3.65) 
40.270* 
(124.88) 
 -2.498* 
(-8.41) 
39.985* 
(135.65) 
Adj R2 
F-statistic 
(prob) 
0.254 
344.73 
(<.0001) 
0.106 
121.44 
(<.0001) 
 0.243 
326.18 
(<.0001) 
0.090 
101.61 
(<.0001) 
 0.212 
 
* significant at the 5% level or better in two-tailed tests 
 
